关键词: 碳税, 休闲农业, 经营主体, 低碳转型, 演化博弈

Abstract: Studying how carbon tax effectively promoted the low carbon transition of leisure agricultural operating entities is of great significance for the sustainable development of leisure agriculture.Based on the bounded rationality assumption,this paper constructed an evolutionary game model of low-carbon transformation for leisure agricultural operating entities under the carbon tax regulations,and analyzed the impact of operating entities on low-carbon transformation from perspectives of uniform carbon tax and discriminated carbon tax policies.The findings are：（1） the government set carbon tax rates impacting on the low-carbon transformation in order to promote low-carbon transformation of business entities,with carbon transition having positive effects and thresholds depending on operators’ low-carbon awareness,carbon sinks,unit carbon emission reduction costs,carbon emission reductions,government carbon sink subsidies,and consumers’ low-carbon preference;（2） among the existing carbon tax threshold factors,the most influential one is the unit carbon reduction cost,and the smaller the difference between it and the carbon tax rate,the more willing the businesses to implement low-carbon actions;（3） by comparing and analyzing the differences between the two policies,it is found that when government sets discriminated carbon tax rate higher than unified carbon tax rate,discriminated the differentiated carbon tax policy would be better; when both are lower than the unified,the unified carbon tax rate policy would be better;and when unified carbon tax rate is between discriminated carbon tax rates,there would be a critical point in tax rate setting at which the two policies can play the same effect;if the rate is set below this point,the discriminated carbon tax policy would be superior.

Key words: carbon tax, leisure agriculture, operating entities, low-carbon transition, evolutionary game